Greaves, H. ‘Discounting future health’. (2017) To appear in Norheim, Emanuel, Jamison, Johansson, Millum, Otterson, Ruger and Verguet (eds.), Global health priority-setting: Cost-effectiveness and beyond, forthcoming with OUP.
Mogensen, A. ‘Should We Prevent Optimific Wrongs?’ Utilitas, vol. 28 (2016), pp. 215-226
Suppose that society has to choose between receiving some benefit now, and receiving the same benefit in ten years’ time. Is the earlier benefit to be preferred, either simply on the ground that it is earlier, or for some other reason that is reliably correlated with the benefit’s timing? To answer in the affirmative is […]
MacAskill, W. ‘Replaceability, Career Choice, and Making a Difference’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 17
Most people believe that some optimific acts are wrong. Since we are not permitted to perform wrong acts, we are not permitted to carry out optimific wrongs. Does the moral relevance of the distinction between action and omission nonetheless permit us to allow others to carry them out? I show that there exists a plausible […]
Greaves, H. ‘Cluelessness’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CXIV, part 3, December 2016.
There are few decisions in life more important than one’s choice of career. Typically, one’s career choice determines how one spends over 80 000 hours—a sizable proportion of one’s waking life. One’s choice of career can therefore be the determining factor in whether one’s life is fruitful or worthless; happy or miserable; admirable or contemptible. […] Remarkably, […]
Greaves, H. and Ord, T. ‘Moral uncertainty about population ethics.’ Forthcoming in Journal of Ethical and Social Philosophy
Decisions, whether moral or prudential, should be guided at least in part by considerations of the consequences that would result from the various available actions. For any given action, however, the majority of its consequences are unpredictable at the time of decision. Many have worried that this leaves us, in some important sense, clueless.
Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one towards choosing […]