A bargaining-theoretic approach to moral uncertainty

Owen Cotton-Barratt (Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford), Hilary Greaves (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)

GPI Working Paper No. 2-2023, published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy

This paper explores a new approach to the problem of decision under relevant moral uncertainty. We treat the case of an agent making decisions in the face of moral uncertainty on the model of bargaining theory, as if the decision-making process were one of bargaining among different internal parts of the agent, with different parts committed to different moral theories. The resulting approach contrasts interestingly with the extant “maximise expected choiceworthiness” and “my favourite theory” approaches, in several key respects. In particular, it seems somewhat less prone than the MEC approach to ‘fanaticism’: allowing decisions to be dictated by a theory in which the agent has extremely low credence, if the relative stakes are high enough. Overall, however, we tentatively conclude that the MEC approach is superior to a bargaining-theoretic approach.

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