Selected philosophy publications by GPI staff

This page features a list of publications by philosophy researchers at the Global Priorities Institute (GPI). It both includes publications by current researchers and publications for which the majority of the research was done while the authors worked at GPI. Publications on topics outside of GPI’s core focus areas are excluded.

See GPI’s working paper series for a list of working papers in GPI’s core focus areas.

Journal articles

2024 and forthcoming

Thornley, E. (forthcoming). Critical-set views, biographical identity, and the long termAustralasian Journal of Philosophy.

Thornley, E. (forthcoming). The Shutdown Problem: An AI engineering puzzle for decision theorists. The Philosophical Studies.

2023

Bales, A. (2023). Will AI avoid exploitation? Artificial general intelligence and expected utility theory. Philosophical Studies.

Barrett, J., & Schmidt, A. T. (forthcoming). Moral uncertainty and public justification. Philosophers' Imprint. 

Beckstead, N., & Thomas, T. (2023). A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values. Noûs, 00, 1–25. 

Bottomley, C., & Williamson, T. L. (2023). Rational risk-aversion: Good things come to those who weight. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 00, 1–29. 

Greaves, H., & Cotton-Barratt, O. (forthcoming). A bargaining-theoretic approach to moral uncertainty. Journal of Moral Philosophy.

Mogensen, A. (forthcoming). The hinge of history hypothesis: Reply to MacAskill. Analysis. 

Mogensen, A. (forthcoming). The weight of suffering. Journal of Philosophy. 

Tarsney, C. (2023). The epistemic challenge to longtermism. Synthese, 201(6), 1–37. 

Tarsney, C, & Thomas, T. (forthcoming). Non-additive axiologies in large worlds. Ergo. 

Thorstad, D. (2023). High risk, low reward: A challenge to the astronomical value of existential risk mitigation. Philosophy and Public Affairs.

Wilkinson, H. (2023). Infinite aggregation and risk. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101, 340-359.

Wilkinson, H. (2023). Can risk aversion survive the long run? The Philosophical Quarterly, 73 (2), 625–647.

2022

Mogensen, A. (2022) The only ethical argument for positive δ? Partiality and pure time preference. Philosophical Studies, 179(9), 2731–50. 

Mogensen, A., & Thorstad, D. (2022) Tough enough? Robust satisficing as a decision norm for long-term policy analysis. Synthese, 200, 36. 

Thomas, T. (2022). The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1–31. 

Wilkinson, H. (2022). In defence of fanaticism. Ethics, 132(2), 445–77. 

Wilkinson, H. (2022). Market harms and market benefits. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 50, 202–238.

Wilkinson, H. (2022). Aggregation in an infinite, relativistic universe. Erkenntnis.

2021

MacAskill, W., Vallinder, A., Oesterheld, C., Shulman, C., & Treutlein, J. (2021). The evidentialist’s wager. Journal of Philosophy, 118(6), 320–342.

Mogensen, A. (2021). Maximal cluelessness. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(1), 141-162. 

Mogensen, A., & MacAskill, W. (2021). The paralysis argument. Philosophers’ Imprint, 21(15), 1-17

2020

Mogensen, A. (2020). Meaning, medicine, and merit. Utilitas, 32(1), 90-107. 

Mogensen, A. (2020). Moral demands and the far future. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(3), 567–585.

Book chapters

2024 and forthcoming

Greaves, H., & MacAskill, W. (forthcoming). The case for strong longtermism. In D. Thorstad, J. Barrett, & H. Greaves (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.

Greaves, H., & Tarsney, C. (forthcoming) Minimal and expansive longtermism. In D. Thorstad, J. Barrett, & H. Greaves (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.

Mogensen, A. (forthcoming) Would a world without us be worse? Clues from population axiology. In D. Thorstad, J. Barrett, & H. Greaves (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.

Tarsney, C., & Wilkinson, H. (forthcoming) Longtermism in an infinite world. In D. Thorstad, J. Barrett, & H. Greaves (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.

Ngo, R., & Bales, A. (forthcoming). Deceit and power: Machine learning and misalignment. In D. Thorstad, J. Barrett, & H. Greaves (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.

Schmidt, A. T., & Barrett, J. (forthcoming). Longtermist political philosophy: An agenda for future research. In J. Barrett, D. Thorstad, & H. Greaves (Eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.

Shulman, C. & Thornley, E. (forthcoming). How much should governments pay to prevent catastrophes? Longtermism's limited role. Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.

2022

MacAskill, W. (2022). Are we living at the hinge of history? In J. McMahan, T. Campbell, J. Goodrich, and K. Ramakrishnan (Eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit (pp. 331-57). Oxford University Press.

Books

2023 and forthcoming

Greaves, H., Barrett, J., and Thorstad, D. (forthcoming). Essays on Longtermism. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

2022

MacAskill, W. (2022). What we owe the future. New York, NY: Basic Books.