'The only ethical argument for positive 𝛿'? 

Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)

GPI Working Paper No. 5-2019, published in Philosophical Studies

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I consider whether a positive rate of pure intergenerational time preference is justifiable in terms of agent-relative moral reasons relating to partiality between generations, an idea I call ​discounting for kinship​. I respond to Parfit's objections to discounting for kinship, but then highlight a number of apparent limitations of this approach. I show that these limitations largely fall away when we reflect on social discounting in the context of decisions that concern the global community as a whole.

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