Choosing the future: Markets, ethics and rapprochement in social discounting

Antony Millner (University of California, Santa Barbara and National Bureau of Economic Research) and Geoffrey Heal (Columbia University and National Bureau of Economic Research)

GPI Working Paper No. 13-2021, published in Journal of Economics Literature

This paper provides a critical review of the literature on choosing social discount rates (SDRs) for public cost-benefit analysis. We discuss two dominant approaches, the first based on market prices, and the second based on intertemporal ethics. While both methods have attractive features, neither is immune to criticism. The market-based approach is not entirely persuasive even if markets are perfect, and faces further headwinds once the implications of market imperfections are recognised. By contrast, the ‘ethical’ approach – which relates SDRs to marginal rates of substitution implicit in a single planner’s intertemporal welfare function – does not rely exclusively on markets, but raises difficult questions about what that welfare function should be. There is considerable disagreement on this matter, which translates into enormous variation in the evaluation of long-run payoffs. We discuss the origins of these disagreements, and suggest that they are difficult to resolve unequivocally. This leads us to propose a third approach that recognises the immutable nature of some normative disagreements, and proposes methods for aggregating diverse theories of intertemporal social welfare. We illustrate the application of these methods to social discounting, and suggest that they may help us to move beyond long-standing debates that have bedevilled this field.

Other working papers

Tiny probabilities and the value of the far future – Petra Kosonen (Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin)

Morally speaking, what matters the most is the far future – at least according to Longtermism. The reason why the far future is of utmost importance is that our acts’ expected influence on the value of the world is mainly determined by their consequences in the far future. The case for Longtermism is straightforward: Given the enormous number of people who might exist in the far future, even a tiny probability of affecting how the far future goes outweighs the importance of our acts’ consequences…

Maximal cluelessness – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)

I argue that many of the priority rankings that have been proposed by effective altruists seem to be in tension with apparently reasonable assumptions about the rational pursuit of our aims in the face of uncertainty. The particular issue on which I focus arises from recognition of the overwhelming importance…

Moral demands and the far future – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)

I argue that moral philosophers have either misunderstood the problem of moral demandingness or at least failed to recognize important dimensions of the problem that undermine many standard assumptions. It has been assumed that utilitarianism concretely directs us to maximize welfare within a generation by transferring resources to people currently living in extreme poverty. In fact, utilitarianism seems to imply that any obligation to help people who are currently badly off is trumped by obligations to undertake actions targeted at improving the value…