Estimating long-term treatment effects without long-term outcome data
David Rhys Bernard (Paris School of Economics)
GPI Working Paper No. 11-2020
This paper has been awarded the paper prize of the 2019 Early Career Conference Programme.
Estimating long-term impacts of actions is important in many areas but the key difficulty is that long-term outcomes are only observed with a long delay. One alternative approach is to measure the effect on an intermediate outcome or a statistical surrogate and then use this to estimate the long-term effect. Athey et al. (2019) generalise the surrogacy method to work with multiple surrogates, rather than just one, increasing its credibility in social science contexts. I empirically test the multiple surrogates approach for long-term effect estimation in real-world conditions using long-run RCTs from development economics. In the context of conditional cash transfers for education in Colombia, I find that the method works well for predicting treatment effects over a 5-year time span but poorly over 10 years due to a reduced set of variables available when attempting to predict effects further into the future. The method is sensitive to observing appropriate surrogates.
Other working papers
How much should governments pay to prevent catastrophes? Longtermism’s limited role – Carl Shulman (Advisor, Open Philanthropy) and Elliott Thornley (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
Longtermists have argued that humanity should significantly increase its efforts to prevent catastrophes like nuclear wars, pandemics, and AI disasters. But one prominent longtermist argument overshoots this conclusion: the argument also implies that humanity should reduce the risk of existential catastrophe even at extreme cost to the present generation. This overshoot means that democratic governments cannot use the longtermist argument to guide their catastrophe policy. …
Consciousness makes things matter – Andrew Y. Lee (University of Toronto)
This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject, or the kind of thing that can be better or worse off. I develop and motivate this view, and then defend it from objections concerning death, non-conscious entities that have interests (such as plants), and conscious subjects that necessarily have welfare level zero. I also explain how my theory of welfare subjects relates to experientialist and anti-experientialist theories of welfare goods.
The scope of longtermism – David Thorstad (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
Longtermism holds roughly that in many decision situations, the best thing we can do is what is best for the long-term future. The scope question for longtermism asks: how large is the class of decision situations for which longtermism holds? Although longtermism was initially developed to describe the situation of…