Evolutionary debunking and value alignment
Michael T. Dale (Hampden-Sydney College) and Bradford Saad (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
GPI Working Paper No. 11-2024
This paper examines the bearing of evolutionary debunking arguments—which use the evolutionary origins of values to challenge their epistemic credentials—on the alignment problem, i.e. the problem of ensuring that highly capable AI systems are properly aligned with values. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are among the best empirically-motivated arguments that recommend changes in values, it is unsurprising that they are relevant to the alignment problem. However, how evolutionary debunking arguments bear on alignment is a neglected issue. This paper sheds light on that issue by showing how evolutionary debunking arguments: (1) raise foundational challenges to posing the alignment problem, (2) yield normative constraints on solving it, and (3) generate stumbling blocks for implementing solutions. After mapping some general features of this philosophical terrain, we illustrate how evolutionary debunking arguments interact with some of the main technical approaches to alignment. To conclude, we motivate a parliamentary approach to alignment and suggest some ways of developing and testing it.
Other working papers
Moral demands and the far future – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
I argue that moral philosophers have either misunderstood the problem of moral demandingness or at least failed to recognize important dimensions of the problem that undermine many standard assumptions. It has been assumed that utilitarianism concretely directs us to maximize welfare within a generation by transferring resources to people currently living in extreme poverty. In fact, utilitarianism seems to imply that any obligation to help people who are currently badly off is trumped by obligations to undertake actions targeted at improving the value…
Intergenerational experimentation and catastrophic risk – Fikri Pitsuwan (Center of Economic Research, ETH Zurich)
I study an intergenerational game in which each generation experiments on a risky technology that provides private benefits, but may also cause a temporary catastrophe. I find a folk-theorem-type result on which there is a continuum of equilibria. Compared to the socially optimal level, some equilibria exhibit too much, while others too little, experimentation. The reason is that the payoff externality causes preemptive experimentation, while the informational externality leads to more caution…
Will AI Avoid Exploitation? – Adam Bales (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
A simple argument suggests that we can fruitfully model advanced AI systems using expected utility theory. According to this argument, an agent will need to act as if maximising expected utility if they’re to avoid exploitation. Insofar as we should expect advanced AI to avoid exploitation, it follows that we should expected advanced AI to act as if maximising expected utility. I spell out this argument more carefully and demonstrate that it fails, but show that the manner of its failure is instructive…