How cost-effective are efforts to detect near-Earth-objects?

Toby Newberry (Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford)

GPI Technical Report No. T1-2021

Near-Earth-objects (NEOs) include asteroids and comets with orbits that bring them into close proximity with Earth. NEOs are well-known to have impacted Earth in the past, sometimes to catastrophic effect.2 Over the past few decades, humanity has taken steps to detect any NEOs on impact trajectories, and, in doing so, we have significantly improved our estimate of the risk that an impact will occur over the next century. This report estimates the cost-effectiveness of such detection efforts. The remainder of this section sets out the context of the report...

Other working papers

Economic inequality and the long-term future – Andreas T. Schmidt (University of Groningen) and Daan Juijn (CE Delft)

Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects…

Aggregating Small Risks of Serious Harms – Tomi Francis (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)

According to Partial Aggregation, a serious harm can be outweighed by a large number of somewhat less serious harms, but can outweigh any number of trivial harms. In this paper, I address the question of how we should extend Partial Aggregation to cases of risk, and especially to cases involving small risks of serious harms. I argue that, contrary to the most popular versions of the ex ante and ex post views, we should sometimes prevent a small risk that a large number of people will suffer serious harms rather than prevent…

Tiny probabilities and the value of the far future – Petra Kosonen (Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin)

Morally speaking, what matters the most is the far future – at least according to Longtermism. The reason why the far future is of utmost importance is that our acts’ expected influence on the value of the world is mainly determined by their consequences in the far future. The case for Longtermism is straightforward: Given the enormous number of people who might exist in the far future, even a tiny probability of affecting how the far future goes outweighs the importance of our acts’ consequences…