How effective is (more) money? Randomizing unconditional cash transfer amounts in the US
Ania Jaroszewicz (University of California San Diego), Oliver P. Hauser (University of Exeter), Jon M. Jachimowicz (Harvard Business School) and Julian Jamison (University of Oxford and University of Exeter)
GPI Working Paper No. 28-2024
We randomized 5,243 Americans in poverty to receive a one-time unconditional cash transfer (UCT) of $2,000 (two months’ worth of total household income for the median participant), $500 (half a month’s income), or nothing. We measured the effects of the UCTs on participants’ financial well-being, psychological well-being, cognitive capacity, and physical health through surveys administered one week, six weeks, and 15 weeks later. While bank data show that both UCTs increased expenditures, we find no evidence that (more) cash had positive impacts on our pre-specified survey outcomes, in contrast to experts’ and laypeople’s incentivized predictions. We test several explanations for these unexpected results. The data are most consistent with the notion that receiving some but not enough money made participants’ (unmet) needs more salient, which caused distress. We develop a model to illustrate how receiving cash can sometimes also highlight its absence. (JEL: C93, D91, I30)
Other working papers
The cross-sectional implications of the social discount rate – Maya Eden (Brandeis University)
How should policy discount future returns? The standard approach to this normative question is to ask how much society should care about future generations relative to people alive today. This paper establishes an alternative approach, based on the social desirability of redistributing from the current old to the current young. …
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule – Florian Brandl (Stanford University), Felix Brandt (Technische Universität München), Dominik Peters (University of Oxford), Christian Stricker (Technische Universität München) and Warut Suksompong (National University of Singapore)
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available budget, such as participatory budgeting or voluntary tax programs, as well as donor coordination when interpreting charities as public projects and donations as contributions. Our aim is to identify a mutually beneficial distribution of the individual contributions. …
Moral uncertainty and public justification – Jacob Barrett (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford) and Andreas T Schmidt (University of Groningen)
Moral uncertainty and disagreement pervade our lives. Yet we still need to make decisions and act, both in individual and political contexts. So, what should we do? The moral uncertainty approach provides a theory of what individuals morally ought to do when they are uncertain about morality…