How many lives does the future hold?
Toby Newberry (Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford)
GPI Technical Report No. T2-2021
The total number of people who have ever lived, across the entire human past, has been estimated at around 100 billion.2 The total number of people who will ever live, across the entire human future, is unknown - but not immune to the tools of rational inquiry. This report estimates the expected size of the future, as measured in units of ‘human-life-equivalents’ (henceforth: ‘lives’). The task is a daunting one, and the aim here is not to be the final word on this subject. Instead, this report aspires to two more modest aims...
Other working papers
Against the singularity hypothesis – David Thorstad (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
The singularity hypothesis is a radical hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on scientifically implausible growth assumptions. …
Crying wolf: Warning about societal risks can be reputationally risky – Lucius Caviola (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford) et al.
Society relies on expert warnings about large-scale risks like pandemics and natural disasters. Across ten studies (N = 5,342), we demonstrate people’s reluctance to warn about unlikely but large-scale risks because they are concerned about being blamed for being wrong. In particular, warners anticipate that if the risk doesn’t occur, they will be perceived as overly alarmist and responsible for wasting societal resources. This phenomenon appears in the context of natural, technological, and financial risks…
Cassandra’s Curse: A second tragedy of the commons – Philippe Colo (ETH Zurich)
This paper studies why scientific forecasts regarding exceptional or rare events generally fail to trigger adequate public response. I consider a game of contribution to a public bad. Prior to the game, I assume contributors receive non-verifiable expert advice regarding uncertain damages. In addition, I assume that the expert cares only about social welfare. Under mild assumptions, I show that no information transmission can happen at equilibrium when the number of contributors…