How many lives does the future hold?
Toby Newberry (Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford)
GPI Technical Report No. T2-2021
The total number of people who have ever lived, across the entire human past, has been estimated at around 100 billion.2 The total number of people who will ever live, across the entire human future, is unknown - but not immune to the tools of rational inquiry. This report estimates the expected size of the future, as measured in units of ‘human-life-equivalents’ (henceforth: ‘lives’). The task is a daunting one, and the aim here is not to be the final word on this subject. Instead, this report aspires to two more modest aims...
Other working papers
Respect for others’ risk attitudes and the long-run future – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
When our choice affects some other person and the outcome is unknown, it has been argued that we should defer to their risk attitude, if known, or else default to use of a risk avoidant risk function. This, in turn, has been claimed to require the use of a risk avoidant risk function when making decisions that primarily affect future people, and to decrease the desirability of efforts to prevent human extinction, owing to the significant risks associated with continued human survival. …
How should risk and ambiguity affect our charitable giving? – Lara Buchak (Princeton University)
Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This paper explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one…
In defence of fanaticism – Hayden Wilkinson (Australian National University)
Consider a decision between: 1) a certainty of a moderately good outcome, such as one additional life saved; 2) a lottery which probably gives a worse outcome, but has a tiny probability of a far better outcome (perhaps trillions of blissful lives created). Which is morally better? Expected value theory (with a plausible axiology) judges (2) as better, no matter how tiny its probability of success. But this seems fanatical. So we may be tempted to abandon expected value theory…