In Defence of Moderation

Jacob Barrett (Vanderbilt University)

GPI Working Paper No. 32-2024

A decision theory is fanatical if it says that, for any sure thing of getting some finite amount of value, it would always be better to almost certainly get nothing while having some tiny probability (no matter how small) of getting sufficiently more finite value. Fanaticism is extremely counterintuitive; common sense requires a more moderate view. However, a recent slew of arguments purport to vindicate it, claiming that moderate alternatives to fanaticism are sometimes similarly counterintuitive, face a powerful continuum argument, and violate widely accepted synchronic and diachronic consistency conditions. In this paper, I defend moderation. I show that certain arguments for fanaticism raise trouble for some versions of moderation—but not for more plausible moderate approaches. Other arguments raise more general difficulties for moderates—but fanatics face these problems too. There is therefore little reason to doubt our commonsensical commitment to moderation, and we can rest easy not worrying too much about tiny probabilities of enormous value.

Other working papers

When should an effective altruist donate? – William MacAskill (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)

Effective altruism is the use of evidence and careful reasoning to work out how to maximize positive impact on others with a given unit of resources, and the taking of action on that basis. It’s a philosophy and a social movement that is gaining considerable steam in the philanthropic world. For example,…

Shutdownable Agents through POST-Agency – Elliott Thornley (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)

Many fear that future artificial agents will resist shutdown. I present an idea – the POST-Agents Proposal – for ensuring that doesn’t happen. I propose that we train agents to satisfy Preferences Only Between Same-Length Trajectories (POST). I then prove that POST – together with other conditions – implies Neutrality+: the agent maximizes expected utility, ignoring the probability distribution over trajectory-lengths. I argue that Neutrality+ keeps agents shutdownable and allows them to be useful.

Calibration dilemmas in the ethics of distribution – Jacob M. Nebel (University of Southern California) and H. Orri Stefánsson (Stockholm University and Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study)

This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several “calibration dilemmas,” in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities—e.g., inequalities in which half the population would gain an arbitrarily large quantity of well-being or resources…