Input to UN Interim Report on Governing AI for Humanity
This document was written by Bradford Saad, with assistance from Andreas Mogensen and Jeff Sebo. Jakob Lohmar provided valuable research assistance. The document benefited from discussion with or feedback from Frankie Andersen-Wood, Adam Bales, Ondrej Bajgar, Thomas Houlden, Jojo Lee, Toby Ord, Teruji Thomas, Elliott Thornley and Eva Vivalt.
Other papers
The unexpected value of the future – Hayden Wilkinson (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
Various philosophers accept moral views that are impartial, additive, and risk-neutral with respect to betterness. But, if that risk neutrality is spelt out according to expected value theory alone, such views face a dire reductio ad absurdum. If the expected sum of value in humanity’s future is undefined—if, e.g., the probability distribution over possible values of the future resembles the Pasadena game, or a Cauchy distribution—then those views say that no real-world option is ever better than any other. And, as I argue…
The case for strong longtermism – Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
A striking fact about the history of civilisation is just how early we are in it. There are 5000 years of recorded history behind us, but how many years are still to come? If we merely last as long as the typical mammalian species…
Once More, Without Feeling – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
I argue for a pluralist theory of moral standing, on which both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status. I argue that autonomy doesn’t entail welfare subjectivity, but can ground moral standing in its absence. Although I highlight the existence of plausible views on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness, I primarily emphasize the need for philosophical debates about the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral standing to engage with neglected questions about the nature…