It Only Takes One: The Psychology of Unilateral Decisions

Joshua Lewis (New York University), Carter Allen (UC Berkeley), Christoph Winter (ITAM, Harvard University and Institute for Law & AI) and Lucius Caviola (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)

GPI Working Paper No. 14-2024

Sometimes, one decision can guarantee that a risky event will happen. For instance, it only took one team of researchers to synthesize and publish the horsepox genome, thus imposing its publication even though other researchers might have refrained for biosecurity reasons. We examine cases where everybody who can impose a given event has the same goal but different information about whether the event furthers that goal. Across 8 experiments (including scenario studies with elected policymakers, doctors, artificial-intelligence researchers, and lawyers and judges and economic games with laypeople, N = 1,518, and 3 supplemental studies, N = 847) people behave suboptimally, balancing two factors. First, people often impose events with expected utility only slightly better than the alternative based on the information available to them, even when others might know more. This approach is insufficiently cautious, leading people to impose too frequently, a situation termed the unilateralist’s curse. Second, counteracting the first factor, people avoid sole responsibility for unexpectedly bad outcomes, sometimes declining to impose seemingly desirable events. The former heuristic typically dominates and people unilaterally impose too often, succumbing to the unilateralist’s curse. But when only few people can impose, who know the stakes are high, responsibility aversion reduces over-imposing.

Other working papers

The Shutdown Problem: An AI Engineering Puzzle for Decision Theorists – Elliott Thornley (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)

I explain and motivate the shutdown problem: the problem of designing artificial agents that (1) shut down when a shutdown button is pressed, (2) don’t try to prevent or cause the pressing of the shutdown button, and (3) otherwise pursue goals competently. I prove three theorems that make the difficulty precise. These theorems suggest that agents satisfying some innocuous-seeming conditions will often try to prevent or cause the pressing of the shutdown button, even in cases where it’s costly to do so. I end by noting that…

Cassandra’s Curse: A second tragedy of the commons – Philippe Colo (ETH Zurich)

This paper studies why scientific forecasts regarding exceptional or rare events generally fail to trigger adequate public response. I consider a game of contribution to a public bad. Prior to the game, I assume contributors receive non-verifiable expert advice regarding uncertain damages. In addition, I assume that the expert cares only about social welfare. Under mild assumptions, I show that no information transmission can happen at equilibrium when the number of contributors…

Against Anti-Fanaticism – Christian Tarsney (Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin)

Should you be willing to forego any sure good for a tiny probability of a vastly greater good? Fanatics say you should, anti-fanatics say you should not. Anti-fanaticism has great intuitive appeal. But, I argue, these intuitions are untenable, because satisfying them in their full generality is incompatible with three very plausible principles: acyclicity, a minimal dominance principle, and the principle that any outcome can be made better or worse. This argument against anti-fanaticism can be…