Longtermism in an Infinite World
Christian J. Tarsney (Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin) and Hayden Wilkinson (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
GPI Working Paper No. 4-2023, forthcoming in Essays on Longtermism
The case for longtermism depends on the vast potential scale of the future. But that same vastness also threatens to undermine the case for longtermism: If the future contains infinite value, then many theories of value that support longtermism (e.g., risk-neutral total utilitarianism) seem to imply that no available action is better than any other. And some strategies for avoiding this conclusion (e.g., exponential time discounting) yield views that are much less supportive of longtermism. This chapter explores how the potential infinitude of the future affects the case for longtermism. We argue that (i) there are reasonable prospects for extending risk- neutral totalism and similar views to infinite contexts and (ii) many such extension strategies still support standard arguments for longtermism, since they imply that when we can only affect (or only predictably affect) a finite part of an infinite universe, we can reason as if only that finite part existed. On the other hand, (iii) there are improbable but not impossible physical scenarios in which our actions can have infinite predictable effects on the far future, and these scenarios create substantial unresolved problems for both infinite ethics and the case for longtermism.
Other working papers
The paralysis argument – William MacAskill, Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
Given plausible assumptions about the long-run impact of our everyday actions, we show that standard non-consequentialist constraints on doing harm entail that we should try to do as little as possible in our lives. We call this the Paralysis Argument. After laying out the argument, we consider and respond to…
What power-seeking theorems do not show – David Thorstad (Vanderbilt University)
Recent years have seen increasing concern that artificial intelligence may soon pose an existential risk to humanity. One leading ground for concern is that artificial agents may be power-seeking, aiming to acquire power and in the process disempowering humanity. A range of power-seeking theorems seek to give formal articulation to the idea that artificial agents are likely to be power-seeking. I argue that leading theorems face five challenges, then draw lessons from this result.
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule – Florian Brandl (Stanford University), Felix Brandt (Technische Universität München), Dominik Peters (University of Oxford), Christian Stricker (Technische Universität München) and Warut Suksompong (National University of Singapore)
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available budget, such as participatory budgeting or voluntary tax programs, as well as donor coordination when interpreting charities as public projects and donations as contributions. Our aim is to identify a mutually beneficial distribution of the individual contributions. …