The Global Priorities Institute is an interdisciplinary research centre at the University of Oxford.
Our aim is to conduct foundational research that informs the decision-making of individuals and institutions seeking to do as much good as possible. We use the tools of multiple academic disciplines, especially philosophy, economics and psychology, to explore the issues at stake.
We prioritise projects whose contributions are unlikely to be otherwise made by the normal run of academic research, and that speak directly to the most crucial considerations such an actor must confront.
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Papers
The Conservation Multiplier – Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)
Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation, and of a donor compensating for conservation. …
Read MoreThe Significance, Persistence, Contingency Framework – William MacAskill, Teruji Thomas (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford) and Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research)
The world, considered from beginning to end, combines many different features, or states of affairs, that contribute to its value. The value of each feature can be factored into its significance—its average value per unit time—and its persistence—how long it lasts. …
Read MoreCassandra’s Curse: A second tragedy of the commons – Philippe Colo (ETH Zurich)
This paper studies why scientific forecasts regarding exceptional or rare events generally fail to trigger adequate public response. I consider a game of contribution to a public bad. Prior to the game, I assume contributors receive non-verifiable expert advice regarding uncertain damages. In addition, I assume that the expert cares only about social welfare. Under mild assumptions, I show that no information transmission can happen at equilibrium when the number of contributors…
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