Parfit Memorial Lecture 2021 - Orri Stefansson (Stockholm University and Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study)

14 June 2021, 4.30-6.30pm, online

The Parfit Memorial Lecture is an annual distinguished lecture series established by the Global Priorities Institute (GPI) in memory of Derek Parfit. The aim is to encourage research among academic philosophers on topics related to global priorities research - using evidence and reason to figure out the most effective ways to improve the world. This year, we are delighted to have Orri Stefansson deliver the Parfit Memorial Lecture. The Parfit Memorial lecture is organised in conjunction with the Atkinson Memorial Lecture.

A recording of the lecture is now available to view here.

The working paper that was the basis for the lecture can be found here.

Should welfare equality be a global priority?

Abstract

Suppose that some near-future generation can make an investment that would hugely benefit some far-future generation (up to the largest metaphysically possible increase in welfare) at the cost of a slight decrease in welfare for the near-future generation. There will otherwise be perfect equality between the two generations. Most people presumably think that it would be better if the near-future generation made the investment, at least as long as the near-future generation would enjoy a sufficiently high standard of living despite the small cost. However, in “Calibration dilemmas in the ethics of distribution,” Jake Nebel and I show that there exist calibration theorems that show that prioritarians or egalitarians who endorse this kind of verdict are committed to giving up what might otherwise seem to be reasonable aversion to inequality when relatively small welfare differences are at stake. The aim of this talk is to discuss calibration dilemmas like these and what they imply for global priorities.

About the speaker

Orri Stefansson is the Associate Professor (Docent) of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, Pro Futura Scientia Fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, and advisor at the Institute for Futures Studies, where he is part of a project on climate ethics. He is also associate editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, and a regular visitor of the Global Priorities Institute. His current research concerns decision-making under extreme uncertainty, distributive ethics, population ethics, and catastrophic risk.

Selected Publications

  • Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities (with Katie Steele), forthcoming, Cambridge University Press.
  • "Additively-Separable and Rank-Discounted Variable-Population Social Welfare Functions" (with Dean Spears), forthcoming in Economic Letters.
  • "Belief Revision for Growing Awareness" (with Katie Steele), forthcoming in Mind.
  • "On the Limits of the Precautionary Principle" Risk Analysis, 39(6): 1204-1222, 2019.
  • "What is Risk Aversion?" (with Richard Bradley), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,  70(1): 77-102, 2019.
  • "What is 'Real' in Probabilism?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(3): 573-587, 2017.

Full list available here.