Simulation expectation
Teruji Thomas (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
GPI Working Paper No. 16-2021, published at Erkenntnis
I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in the ground-level of reality. (Similar arguments can be marshalled for the view that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary people, but I focus on the case of simulations.) I explain how this argument overcomes some objections to Bostrom’s classic argument for the same conclusion. I also consider to what extent the argument depends upon an internalist conception of evidence, and I refute the common line of thought that finding many simulations being run—or running them ourselves—must increase the odds that we are in a simulation.
Other working papers
Prediction: The long and the short of it – Antony Millner (University of California, Santa Barbara) and Daniel Heyen (ETH Zurich)
Commentators often lament forecasters’ inability to provide precise predictions of the long-run behaviour of complex economic and physical systems. Yet their concerns often conflate the presence of substantial long-run uncertainty with the need for long-run predictability; short-run predictions can partially substitute for long-run predictions if decision-makers can adjust their activities over time. …
In Defence of Moderation – Jacob Barrett (Vanderbilt University)
A decision theory is fanatical if it says that, for any sure thing of getting some finite amount of value, it would always be better to almost certainly get nothing while having some tiny probability (no matter how small) of getting sufficiently more finite value. Fanaticism is extremely counterintuitive; common sense requires a more moderate view. However, a recent slew of arguments purport to vindicate it, claiming that moderate alternatives to fanaticism are sometimes similarly counterintuitive, face a powerful continuum argument…
Moral uncertainty and public justification – Jacob Barrett (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford) and Andreas T Schmidt (University of Groningen)
Moral uncertainty and disagreement pervade our lives. Yet we still need to make decisions and act, both in individual and political contexts. So, what should we do? The moral uncertainty approach provides a theory of what individuals morally ought to do when they are uncertain about morality…