The unexpected value of the future 

Hayden Wilkinson (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)

GPI Working Paper No. 17-2022, forthcoming in Ergo

Various philosophers accept moral views that are impartial, additive, and risk-neutral with respect to betterness. But, if that risk neutrality is spelt out according to expected value theory alone, such views face a dire reductio ad absurdum. If the expected sum of value in humanity’s future is undefined—if, e.g., the probability distribution over possible values of the future resembles the Pasadena game, or a Cauchy distribution—then those views say that no real-world option is ever better than any other. And, as I argue, our evidence plausibly supports such a probability distribution. Indeed, it supports a probability distribution that cannot be evaluated even if we extend expected value theory according to one of several extensions proposed in the literature. Must we therefore reject all impartial, additive, risk-neutral moral theories? It turns out that we need not. I provide a potential solution: by adopting a strong enough extension of expected value theory, we can evaluate that problematic distribution and potentially salvage those moral views.

Other working papers

The long-run relationship between per capita incomes and population size – Maya Eden (University of Zurich) and Kevin Kuruc (Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin)

The relationship between the human population size and per capita incomes has long been debated. Two competing forces feature prominently in these discussions. On the one hand, a larger population means that limited natural resources must be shared among more people. On the other hand, more people means more innovation and faster technological progress, other things equal. We study a model that features both of these channels. A calibration suggests that, in the long run, (marginal) increases in population would…

The case for strong longtermism – Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)

A striking fact about the history of civilisation is just how early we are in it. There are 5000 years of recorded history behind us, but how many years are still to come? If we merely last as long as the typical mammalian species…

Is Existential Risk Mitigation Uniquely Cost-Effective? Not in Standard Population Models – Gustav Alexandrie (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford) and Maya Eden (Brandeis University)

What socially beneficial causes should philanthropists prioritize if they give equal ethical weight to the welfare of current and future generations? Many have argued that, because human extinction would result in a permanent loss of all future generations, extinction risk mitigation should be the top priority given this impartial stance. Using standard models of population dynamics, we challenge this conclusion. We first introduce a theoretical framework for quantifying undiscounted cost-effectiveness over…