Time discounting, consistency and special obligations: a defence of Robust Temporalism
Harry R. Lloyd (Yale University)
GPI Working Paper No. 11-2021
This is the winning entry of the Essay Prize for global priorities research 2021. The uploaded paper is the full, revised draft of the abridged paper submitted for the prize competition.
This paper defends the claim that mere temporal proximity always and without exception strengthens certain moral duties, including the duty to save – call this view Robust Temporalism. Although almost all other moral philosophers dismiss Robust Temporalism out of hand, I argue that it is prima facie intuitively plausible, and that it is analogous to a view about special obligations that many philosophers already accept. I also defend Robust Temporalism against several common objections, and I highlight its relevance to a number of practical policy debates, including longtermism. My conclusion is that Robust Temporalism is a moral live option, that deserves to be taken much more seriously in the future.
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