William MacAskill: Effective Altruism
Forthcoming in The Norton Introduction to Ethics
Other papers
Simulation expectation – Teruji Thomas (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
I present a new argument for the claim that I’m much more likely to be a person living in a computer simulation than a person living in the ground-level of reality. I consider whether this argument can be blocked by an externalist view of what my evidence supports, and I urge caution against the easy assumption that actually finding lots of simulations would increase the odds that I myself am in one.
Once More, Without Feeling – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
I argue for a pluralist theory of moral standing, on which both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status. I argue that autonomy doesn’t entail welfare subjectivity, but can ground moral standing in its absence. Although I highlight the existence of plausible views on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness, I primarily emphasize the need for philosophical debates about the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and moral standing to engage with neglected questions about the nature…
How many lives does the future hold? – Toby Newberry (Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford)
The total number of people who have ever lived, across the entire human past, has been estimated at around 100 billion. The total number of people who will ever live, across the entire human future, is unknown – but not immune to the tools of rational inquiry…