Population ethics with thresholds
Walter Bossert (University of Montreal), Susumu Cato (University of Tokyo) and Kohei Kamaga (Sophia University)
GPI Working Paper No. 3-2025
We propose a new class of social quasi-orderings in a variable-population setting. In order to declare one utility distribution at least as good as another, the critical-level utilitarian value of the former must reach or surpass the value of the latter. For each possible absolute value of the difference between the population sizes of two distributions to be compared, we specify a non-negative threshold level and a threshold inequality. This inequality indicates whether the corresponding threshold level must be reached or surpassed in the requisite comparison. All of these threshold critical-level utilitarian quasi-orderings perform same-number comparisons by means of the utilitarian criterion. In addition to this entire class of quasi-orderings, we axiomatize two important subclasses. The members of the first subclass are associated with proportional threshold functions, and the well-known critical-band utilitarian quasi-orderings are included in this subclass. The quasi-orderings in the second subclass employ constant threshold functions; the members of this second class have, to the best of our knowledge, not been examined so far. Furthermore, we characterize the members of our class that (i) avoid the repugnant conclusion; (ii) avoid the sadistic conclusions; and (iii) respect the mere-addition principle.
Other working papers
The long-run relationship between per capita incomes and population size – Maya Eden (University of Zurich) and Kevin Kuruc (Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin)
The relationship between the human population size and per capita incomes has long been debated. Two competing forces feature prominently in these discussions. On the one hand, a larger population means that limited natural resources must be shared among more people. On the other hand, more people means more innovation and faster technological progress, other things equal. We study a model that features both of these channels. A calibration suggests that, in the long run, (marginal) increases in population would…
Doomsday and objective chance – Teruji Thomas (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
Lewis’s Principal Principle says that one should usually align one’s credences with the known chances. In this paper I develop a version of the Principal Principle that deals well with some exceptional cases related to the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic modality. I explain how this principle gives a unified account of the Sleeping Beauty problem and chance-based principles of anthropic reasoning…
Consequentialism, Cluelessness, Clumsiness, and Counterfactuals – Alan Hájek (Australian National University)
According to a standard statement of objective consequentialism, a morally right action is one that has the best consequences. More generally, given a choice between two actions, one is morally better than the other just in case the consequences of the former action are better than those of the latter. (These are not just the immediate consequences of the actions, but the long-term consequences, perhaps until the end of history.) This account glides easily off the tongue—so easily that…