The structure of critical sets
Walter Bossert (University of Montreal), Susumu Cato (University of Tokyo) and Kohei Kamaga (Sophia University)
GPI Working Paper No. 4-2025
The purpose of this paper is to address some ambiguities and misunderstandings that appear in previous studies of population ethics. In particular, we examine the structure of intervals that are employed in assessing the value of adding people to an existing population. Our focus is on critical-band utilitarianism and critical-range utilitarianism, which are commonly-used population theories that employ intervals, and we show that some previously assumed equivalences are not true in general. The possible discrepancies can be attributed to the observation that critical bands need not be equal to critical sets. The critical set for a moral quasi-ordering is composed of all utility numbers such that adding someone with a utility level in this set leads to a distribution that is not comparable to the original (non-augmented) distribution. The only case in which critical bands and critical sets coincide obtains when the critical band is an open interval. In this respect, there is a stark contrast between critical-band utilitarianism and critical-range utilitarianism: the critical set that corresponds to a critical-range quasi-ordering always coincides with the interval that is used to define the requisite quasi-ordering. As a consequence, an often presumed equivalence of critical-band utilitarianism and critical-range utilitarianism is not valid unless, again, the critical band and the critical range (and, consequently, the requisite critical sets) are given by the same open interval.
Other working papers
Misjudgment Exacerbates Collective Action Problems – Joshua Lewis (New York University) et al.
In collective action problems, suboptimal collective outcomes arise from each individual optimizing their own wellbeing. Past work assumes individuals do this because they care more about themselves than others. Yet, other factors could also contribute. We examine the role of empirical beliefs. Our results suggest people underestimate individual impact on collective problems. When collective action seems worthwhile, individual action often does not, even if the expected ratio of costs to benefits is the same. …
Respect for others’ risk attitudes and the long-run future – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
When our choice affects some other person and the outcome is unknown, it has been argued that we should defer to their risk attitude, if known, or else default to use of a risk avoidant risk function. This, in turn, has been claimed to require the use of a risk avoidant risk function when making decisions that primarily affect future people, and to decrease the desirability of efforts to prevent human extinction, owing to the significant risks associated with continued human survival. …
Exceeding expectations: stochastic dominance as a general decision theory – Christian Tarsney (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal’s Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls…