The structure of critical sets

Walter Bossert (University of Montreal), Susumu Cato (University of Tokyo) and Kohei Kamaga (Sophia University)

GPI Working Paper No. 4-2025

The purpose of this paper is to address some ambiguities and misunderstandings that appear in previous studies of population ethics. In particular, we examine the structure of intervals that are employed in assessing the value of adding people to an existing population. Our focus is on critical-band utilitarianism and critical-range utilitarianism, which are commonly-used population theories that employ intervals, and we show that some previously assumed equivalences are not true in general. The possible discrepancies can be attributed to the observation that critical bands need not be equal to critical sets. The critical set for a moral quasi-ordering is composed of all utility numbers such that adding someone with a utility level in this set leads to a distribution that is not comparable to the original (non-augmented) distribution. The only case in which critical bands and critical sets coincide obtains when the critical band is an open interval. In this respect, there is a stark contrast between critical-band utilitarianism and critical-range utilitarianism: the critical set that corresponds to a critical-range quasi-ordering always coincides with the interval that is used to define the requisite quasi-ordering. As a consequence, an often presumed equivalence of critical-band utilitarianism and critical-range utilitarianism is not valid unless, again, the critical band and the critical range (and, consequently, the requisite critical sets) are given by the same open interval.

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