Estimating long-term treatment effects without long-term outcome data
David Rhys Bernard (Paris School of Economics)
GPI Working Paper No. 11-2020
This paper has been awarded the paper prize of the 2019 Early Career Conference Programme.
Estimating long-term impacts of actions is important in many areas but the key difficulty is that long-term outcomes are only observed with a long delay. One alternative approach is to measure the effect on an intermediate outcome or a statistical surrogate and then use this to estimate the long-term effect. Athey et al. (2019) generalise the surrogacy method to work with multiple surrogates, rather than just one, increasing its credibility in social science contexts. I empirically test the multiple surrogates approach for long-term effect estimation in real-world conditions using long-run RCTs from development economics. In the context of conditional cash transfers for education in Colombia, I find that the method works well for predicting treatment effects over a 5-year time span but poorly over 10 years due to a reduced set of variables available when attempting to predict effects further into the future. The method is sensitive to observing appropriate surrogates.
Other working papers
Cassandra’s Curse: A second tragedy of the commons – Philippe Colo (ETH Zurich)
This paper studies why scientific forecasts regarding exceptional or rare events generally fail to trigger adequate public response. I consider a game of contribution to a public bad. Prior to the game, I assume contributors receive non-verifiable expert advice regarding uncertain damages. In addition, I assume that the expert cares only about social welfare. Under mild assumptions, I show that no information transmission can happen at equilibrium when the number of contributors…
Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule – Florian Brandl (Stanford University), Felix Brandt (Technische Universität München), Dominik Peters (University of Oxford), Christian Stricker (Technische Universität München) and Warut Suksompong (National University of Singapore)
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available budget, such as participatory budgeting or voluntary tax programs, as well as donor coordination when interpreting charities as public projects and donations as contributions. Our aim is to identify a mutually beneficial distribution of the individual contributions. …
‘The only ethical argument for positive 𝛿’? – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
I consider whether a positive rate of pure intergenerational time preference is justifiable in terms of agent-relative moral reasons relating to partiality between generations, an idea I call discounting for kinship. I respond to Parfit’s objections to discounting for kinship, but then highlight a number of apparent limitations of this…