A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values
Nick Beckstead (Open Philanthropy Project) and Teruji Thomas (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
GPI Working Paper No. 7-2021, published in Noûs
We show that every theory of the value of uncertain prospects must have one of three unpalatable properties. Reckless theories recommend risking arbitrarily great gains at arbitrarily long odds for the sake of enormous potential; timid theories permit passing up arbitrarily great gains to prevent a tiny increase in risk; non-transitive theories deny the principle that, if A is better than B and B is better than C, then A must be better than C. While non-transitivity has been much discussed, we draw out the costs and benefits of recklessness and timidity when it comes to axiology, decision theory, and moral uncertainty.
Other working papers
Non-additive axiologies in large worlds – Christian Tarsney and Teruji Thomas (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
Is the overall value of a world just the sum of values contributed by each value-bearing entity in that world? Additively separable axiologies (like total utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and critical level views) say ‘yes’, but non-additive axiologies (like average utilitarianism, rank-discounted utilitarianism, and variable value views) say ‘no’…
The case for strong longtermism – Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
A striking fact about the history of civilisation is just how early we are in it. There are 5000 years of recorded history behind us, but how many years are still to come? If we merely last as long as the typical mammalian species…
Intergenerational experimentation and catastrophic risk – Fikri Pitsuwan (Center of Economic Research, ETH Zurich)
I study an intergenerational game in which each generation experiments on a risky technology that provides private benefits, but may also cause a temporary catastrophe. I find a folk-theorem-type result on which there is a continuum of equilibria. Compared to the socially optimal level, some equilibria exhibit too much, while others too little, experimentation. The reason is that the payoff externality causes preemptive experimentation, while the informational externality leads to more caution…