The Conservation Multiplier

Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)

GPI Working Paper No. 13 - 2022, published in Journal of Political Economy

Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation, and of a donor compensating for conservation. A successful donor pays every period for each unit; a successful lobby pays once. This asymmetry causes inefficient exploitation. A normative analysis uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the party in power, to the general public, or to the lobby.

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