The unexpected value of the future
Hayden Wilkinson (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
GPI Working Paper No. 17-2022
Consider longtermism: the view that the morally best options available to us, in many important practical decisions, are those that provide the greatest improvements in the (ex ante) value of the far future. Many who accept longtermism do so because they accept an impartial, aggregative theory of moral betterness in conjunction with expected value theory. But such a combination of views implies absurdity if the (impartial, aggregated) value of humanity’s future is undefined—if, e.g., the probability distribution over possible values of the future resembles the Pasadena game, or a Cauchy distribution. In this paper, I argue that our evidence requires us to adopt such a probability distribution—indeed, a distribution that cannot be evaluated even by the extensions of expected value theory that have so far been proposed. I propose a new method of extending expected value theory, which allows us to deal with this distribution and to salvage the case for longtermism. I also consider how risk-averse decision theories might deal with such a case, and offer a surprising argument in favour of risk aversion in moral decision-making.
Other working papers
The epistemic challenge to longtermism – Christian Tarsney (Global Priorities Institute, Oxford University)
Longtermists claim that what we ought to do is mainly determined by how our actions might affect the very long-run future. A natural objection to longtermism is that these effects may be nearly impossible to predict— perhaps so close to impossible that, despite the astronomical importance of the far future, the expected value of our present actions is mainly determined by near-term considerations. This paper aims to precisify and evaluate one version of this epistemic objection to longtermism…
The Conservation Multiplier – Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)
Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation, and of a donor compensating for conservation. …
The Hinge of History Hypothesis: Reply to MacAskill – Andreas Mogensen (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford)
Some believe that the current era is uniquely important with respect to how well the rest of human history goes. Following Parfit, call this the Hinge of History Hypothesis. Recently, MacAskill has argued that our era is actually very unlikely to be especially influential in the way asserted by the Hinge of History Hypothesis. I respond to MacAskill, pointing to important unresolved ambiguities in his proposed definition of what it means for a time to be influential and criticizing the two arguments…